We propose a model for price formation in financial markets based on clearing of a standard call auction with random orders, and verify its validity for prediction of the daily closing price distribution statistically. The model considers random buy and sell orders, placed following demand-and supply-side valuation distributions; an equilibrium equation then leads to a distribution for clearing price and transacted volume. Bid and ask volumes are left as free parameters, permitting possibly heavy-tailed or very skewed order flow conditions. In highly liquid auctions, the clearing price distribution converges to an 
Introduction
In modern financial markets most securities are traded in continuous double auctions. During the trading day a sell/buy order for a price lower/higher than or equal to the best bid/ask price is immediately executed versus the limit order book on the bid/ask side. If a sell/buyorder has a price higher/lower than the best bid/ask, it is added to the limit order book on the ask/bid side. To start and stop trading and determine daily opening and closing prices, standard call auctions are conducted for most securities. In these opening and closing auctions buy and sell orders are collected over a set interval in time, after which a clearing price X is determined to clear the maximal executable volume [12] , transacting all against the price X.
A large part of the market microstructure literature focusses on detailed modelling of con-tinuous double auctions and the limit order book. There are essentially two different lines of work: equilibrium models in which order arrival is governed by decisions of individual agents trying to maximize utility (see e.g. [5, 6, 13, 14, 21, 23] ) and stochastic limit order book models in which order arrival is completely stochastic (see e.g. [1, 8, 9, 17, 20, 24] , among many others). Some extensive studies of empirical properties of the limit order book are [3, 4, 7, 22] .
The standard call auction has received less attention: Mendelson [18] models a call auction in which all orders have size one and are uniformly distributed over some price interval, while buy and sell orders arrive c.f. a homogeneous Poisson process. The distribution of transacted volume is derived, together with the clearing price expectation. Technically, this paper is related to the work of Toke [19] , who gives the full solution of Mendelson's call auction model, deriving distributions for transacted volume, and lower/upper clearing prices, as well as asymptotic distributions in very liquid call auctions.
At the conceptual level, our approach is related to the seminal paper by Smith et al. [24] , who consider a statistical model for continuous double auctions assuming i.i.d. random order flow, modelled through independent, homogeneous Poisson processes for market orders, limit orders and cancellations with random order-prices from a single, uniform valuation distribution.
Simulations, dimensional analysis and mean-field approximations then lead to predictions for price volatility, market depth, price-impact function, bid-ask spread and probability/time to fill a limit order.
In this paper we propose a model for price formation in financial markets with a bid/ask equilibrium equation at its core, that sets the clearing price such as to lead to maximal transacted volume, based on fixed numbers N A , N B of unit-sized sell and buy orders forming i.i.d. samples from distinct valuation distributions F A and F B . Due to the randomness in the orders, the equilibrium gives rise to a distribution for X|N A , N B , the clearing price conditional on N A , N B . The shape of the valuation distributions F A , F B and the distribution of the pair (N A , N B ) remain unspecified; while the former models resistance levels, the latter permits great freedom of modelling order flow conditions, including auctions in which extreme or skewed liquidity-conditions disturb equilibria and distort clearing prices. We derive closedform expressions for distributions of clearing prices, jointly with transacted volumes.
Such mechanisms have direct application in the modelling of opening and closing auctions as demonstrated with data from closing auctions of several Eurostoxx 50 constituents in section 7. Extending the argument more informally, we argue that the model applies also in continuous trading: if buy/sell orders are accrued over a period of time (and liquidity providers trade with a more-or-less neutral combined inventory) then, at the aggregate level, the detailed process of trading during the period can be interpreted as market-clearing at a price X with a distribution that depends on valuation distributions F A , F B and the distribution of the pair (N A , N B ) that reflects order flow conditions during the interval. If liquidity providers do not trade neutrally, or if we take a limit order book into account, the equilibrium between newly accrued buy and sell orders is perturbed by so-called excess liquidity, which can be taken into account in full generality and lies at the heart of many interesting properties associated with real-world phenomena.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In section 2, the model is introduced and probability distributions for clearing price and volume are derived. In section 3, we consider auctions in which the number of incoming orders is very large. Asymptotically the clearing price has a normal distribution, which implies that if we approximate continuous trading by a periodically cleared market, the resulting discrete price process follows a Brownian path. This is roughly in support of general pricing models based on the efficient market hypothesis, with mean and variance of the return distribution expressed in terms of the distributions of supply, demand and order flow. In section 4 we examine the influence of changing supply, demand and order flow distributions on the clearing price distribution, while we explore in section 5 how changing supply and demand distributions affect the joint distribution of clearing price and transacted volume, leading to a distinction between two different types of auction price variance; one occuring when transacted volumes are high, the other one when these are low. In section 6 we study the model's perspective on the price impact of market orders. Remarkably, the model reproduces the concave price impact functions observed empirically [10, 15, 16] and explained theoretically [2, 11, 24] . In section 7 the model is applied to estimate the distribution of the clearing price of a closing auction, based on the day's transaction data. For 5 (randomly selected) shares belonging to the Eurostoxx 50 index, it is shown that the model predicts the probability distribution of the closing price with precision, through assessment of QQ-plots and Kolgomorov-Smirnov statistics. For comparison, a more crude alternative method of estimation is assessed on the same basis. It is shown that the market clearing model provides significantly better estimates for clearing price distributions than this more straightforward method. Most important results are summarized in the concluding section 8.
Proofs of the theoretical results of sections 2 and 3 as well as notation and conventions are collected in appendix A.
Stochastic market clearing
In this section, we introduce the model and derive expressions for the distributions of central quantities in the clearing process.
Supply/demand equilibrium
Let us consider a standard call auction for a given asset. In the auction, buy and sell orders are matched to transact at a clearing price X, determined in such a way that the total transacted volume is maximal. Suppose that N A sell orders are submitted, as well as N B buy orders and that every order has equal size (set to one). We assume that participants on both sides of the market formulate their orders independently of each other, according to certain valuation distributions. That is, we model the ask prices as an i.i.d. sample (A 1 , . . . A N A ) from a supply (or ask) distribution F A and the bid prices as an i.i.d. sample (B 1 , . . . , B N B ) from a demand (or bid) distribution F B . The interpretation of F A is as follows: the probability that a randomly selected seller is willing to sell the asset for an ask price A ≤ x, is given by F A (x), for all x ∈ R. Similarly, if we randomly select a buyer, the probability that he is willing to buy the asset for a bid price B ≤ x is given by F B (x). Naturally ask prices are higher than bid prices, however, the ordering is expressed through the supply and demand distributions F A , F B , through the assumption that,
for all x ∈ X . Note that the ordering of buy prices below sell prices cannot be defined in very strict or deterministic ways; the uncertainty in A, B and the stochastic nature of the ordering enables crossing prices and thereby, matchable orders and the auction itself. 
For every x ∈ R, denote the number of submitted sell orders with a price less than or equal to
x by D A (x) and the number of submitted buy orders with a price greater than x by D B (x).
As discussed above, the clearing price X is obtained by maximizing the total transacted volume. In terms of the above defined quantities, that implies X is defined as a solution of
which expresses that the transacted volume is maximized at (any) price X where the supply curve D A and the demand curve D B intersect. Consider the following definition.
Definition 2.1 For a given sell order sample (A 1 , . . . A N A ) from F A and a buy order sample (B 1 , . . . , B N B ) from F B , the corresponding clearing price X is defined by
1 Of course these independence assumptions are not realistic: especially when prices fluctuate a lot, it is likely that market participants on both sides of the market react on each other's decisions and hence their quotes are far from independent. However, we argue that, despite these simplifying assumptions, the model can still be interpreted as a reasonable description of price formation in auctions, as is confirmed by the results in Section 7.
Remark 2.2 It should be noted that there are issues of existence and uniqueness of solutions to (2) . Firstly, when the bid-and ask-samples are such that, In subsequent subsections, closed-form expressions are provided for the probability distributions (conditional, given (N A , N B )) of several important market quantities, like clearing price X and transacted volume V .
While this stochastic model of price formation is based on the mechanism of a call auction, the clearing price also has an interpretation for continuous trading. To appreciate the relation, the process of continuous bidding and transacting (with matching of orders as an instantaneous but momentary form of clearing) should be viewed in an aggregated form over an interval of time I. During any such interval the numbers of buyers and sellers must still be equal, and that is exactly what equation (2) expresses. Then, at the aggregate level, the detailed, step-by-step process of trading during the interval may be modelled equivalently (or in close approximation) as market clearing at a clearing price X associated with the interval I.
For both the auction and the continuous trading interpretations, the following applies: if The unrestricted freedom in the choices for F A , F B and the distribution of (N A , N B ) enables use of empirical fits for these distributions from previous intervals. It is also possible to make definite, default choices for these quantities: for instance, choosing independent Poisson distributions for N A and N B would correspond to the assumption of Poisson order flow, which is omnipresent in the literature (see, among many others, [1, 8, 9, 20, 24] for examples in context of continuous double auctions and [18, 19] for examples in the standard call auction).
In Section 4 we consider further possible choices for the distribution of (N A , N B ) and the model properties implied.
Distribution of clearing price and volume
In this subsection we derive the probability distributions of price and price-volume, resulting from the equilibrium equation (2), without and with a limit order book. We concentrate on the marginal distribution of the clearing price X only first, given by the following theorem (proved in the appendix).
Theorem 2.3 (Clearing price distribution) The distribution of the clearing price X, conditional on N A and N B , is given by,
However, it is also possible to derive the joint distribution of clearing price and transacted volume, which is defined next (see also remark A.3).
Definition 2.4 The transacted volume V corresponding to the clearing price X, is defined by V = D A (X).
In the next theorem (proved in the appendix), an explicit expression for the joint distribution of X and V is provided. It is assumed that the price-axis X is a discrete set, X := {x 0 , x 0 + δ, . . . }, where δ is the ticksize.
Theorem 2.5 (Joint clearing price/transacted volume distribution) The joint distribution of clearing price X and transacted volume V , conditional on N A and N B , is given by,
Excess liquidity
There are several variations possible on the definition of the clearing price X as given above:
to start with, during continuous trading, exchanges often offer an open limit order book, which contains all visible limit orders on ask-side and bid-side. Denote by L A (x) the total volume on the ask-side of the limit order book for a price less than or equal to x. Similarly, denote by L B (x) the total volume on the bid-side of the limit order book for a price above
x. Then definition 2.1 of the clearing price X is adapted to,
corresponding to an adapted market clearing equation that takes the limit order book into account:
Note that x → L A (x) and x → L B (x) are non-stochastic quantities and that for any x, either
is equal to zero (as, otherwise, the book could be cleared further by matching the overlapping orders).
To generalize, we include excess liquidity as any sort of liquidity that plays a role in the clearing process, but does not originate from the quoting process as described by F A and F B .
As such, we view excess liquidity as an external influence.
Definition 2.6 If the clearing price X is defined by the equation,
where ∆ : X → Z is a right-continuous, non-increasing function, then ∆ is called the excess liquidity.
Excess liquidity takes the market out of the 'pure' equilibrium given by
For example, inclusion of the limit order book is possible through
Positive values of ∆(x) correspond to an excess demand and negative values of ∆(x) mean an excess supply. Another example of excess liquidity is the arrival of a market order. A sell market order of size ω ∈ N corresponds to the constant function ∆ = −ω1 X , while a buy market order is described by the function ∆ = ω1 X . Similarly, a buy limit order with limit price b can be described by ∆ = ω1 [x 0 ,b] and a sell limit order with limit price a by
Lemma A.1 can be re-derived with excess liquidity, in order to obtain the equivalence X ≤
Exactly like in the proof of theorem 2.3, this leads to the distribution of the clearing price, conditional on N A and N B , as stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 2.7 (Clearing price distribution in case of excess liquidity) When excess liquidity x → ∆(x) plays a role, the clearing price distribution conditional on N A , N B , is given by
where
Note that the limit order book makes an appearance only in the summation bound, leaving the binomial character of the equilibrium distribution intact.
The high-liquidity limit
In this section, we provide the asymptotic clearing price distribution in limit of infinite liquidity.
To be more precise, denote N = N A + N B , let N A = αN , N B = (1 − α)N for some constant 0 < α < 1 we refer to as order flow imbalance and consider the limit N → ∞. We take a continuous price-axis X = [x 0 , ∞) and assume that the distribution functions F A and F B are continuous and strictly increasing, describing measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, with densities denoted f A and f B . Let X denote a
, with possibly non-zero excess liquidity ∆.
Denote by x E the real equilibrium price which is the (non-random) price uniquely defined by the equilibrium equation,
According to the following theorem (the proof of which can be found in the appendix), the clearing price X is in the limit distributed according to a normal distribution centred on x E with variance that depends on f A and f B . 
where the asymptotic mean and standard deviation are given by,
and x E is the real equilibrium price.
Consider a standard call auction in which the number of orders collected is very large. The clearing price distribution is then closely concentrated around x E and has a width proportional to 1/ √ N . So the model confirms the intuition that large auctions lead to accurate price discovery and adds that this accuracy is inversely proportional to the square root of the number of orders. Non-zero excess liquidity of order √ N biases X away from x E , however, this bias is also proportional to 1/ √ N . So the model says that in highly liquid auctions or markets, external influence in the form of excess liquidity ∆ must be of order larger than √ N to force (the distribution of) the clearing price away from the real equilibrium price x E .
Furthermore, the shift caused by the excess liquidity is inversely proportional to a convex combination of f A and f B , hence price impact will be larger if the density of orders around the equilibrium price is low.
Next consider the case of continuous trading of a stock in an interval, during which supply and demand are described by the distributions F A and F B , and by order flow imbalance α ∈ (0, 1).
Assume that the number of incoming orders during the interval is very large, so that the limit of theorem 3.1 forms a good approximation for the clearing price distribution. In the absence of excess liquidity, the distribution of the clearing price associated with the interval is a sharply peaked normal distribution centred at the real equilibrium price. Finally, note that the variance in (7) is not only dependent on τ 2 (x E ) in the way one might expect, but like the location in (7), it is inverse proportional to a liquidity-weighted convex combination of f A and f B , evaluated at the real equilibrium price. So the volatility of the Brownian path (as well as the influence of excess liquidity) goes down in ranges where orders are concentrated and goes up in ranges where orders are sparse. Consequently, the Brownian path has long occupation times in ranges where orders are dense, the resistance levels that play such a prominent role in what is referred to as the 'technical analysis' of stock prices. 
Setting F A = F B = F and D = 0 in our result, the solution to (6) is
Order flow distributions
All the distributions derived in section 2, are conditional on the pair (N A , N B ). In this subsection we discuss some possibilities for the distribution of (N A , N B ) (the so-called order flow distribution) and their consequences for clearing price distributions.
Stochastic order flow
The common assumption in the (early) literature is what is called Poisson order flow : for continuous double auctions [1, 8, 9, 20, 24] and call auctions [18, 19] , Poisson order flow follows from assumed independent Poisson processes for the arrival of buy and sell orders.
Here, we would take,
for Poisson rates µ A , µ B and a given interval duration T to achieve the same.
However, in this setting it makes sense to consider more general models for order flow. Assume 
for some p ∈ (0, 1) representing order flow imbalance. Taking,
is equivalent to,
. Both Poisson and binomial proposals express the conviction that order flow imbalance α := N A /N does not display great stochastic fluctuation and lies close to its expectation p, especially for greater values of N due to the central limit theorem. This makes it difficult to capture market phenomena that are due to fat tails in the order flow distribution, to describe more extreme, yet common market conditions.
Hence our third proposal: we consider beta order flow imbalance,
Choice of the parameters β 1 , β 2 permits great modelling freedom. For instance, if we expect the order flow on the bid-and ask-side to be roughly balanced, it is appropriate to set β 1 = β 2 .
If we expect the market to be out of balance (e.g. while trending), we may choose β 1 > β 2 when we expect more supply than demand, and vice versa. Perhaps most interesting is the scale of the betas: if β 1 , β 2 < 1 we induce the fat tails not seen in Poisson or binomial order flow, while β 1 , β 2 1 will lower the variance and bring α close to its expectation β 1 /(β 1 +β 2 ).
Balanced and unbalanced markets
To shed more light on the influence of the order flow distribution on the clearing price distribution, we consider a simple example. To focus on order flow, we make the trivial choices for the other parameters:
for µ = 10 and σ = 0.1. In figure 2 the real supply and demand curves x → N A F A (x) and x → N B (1 − F B (x)), are shown for a balanced and an unbalanced situation. In the balanced situation the real equilibrium price x E equals 10, but when there are more sell than buy orders, x E decreases. We expect the clearing price distribution to centre around x E , so the imbalance leads to lower clearing prices, one could say by selling pressure. To appreciate the effects of order flow on clearing price distributions more directly, consider figure 3, the probability density f X of the clearing price is plotted for various balanced (left 
Order flow and resistance levels
So far we have taken trivial valuation distributions F A , F B to illustrate the effect of the order flow distribution in isolation. To demonstrate how order flow may interact with valuation distributions, we consider another stylized example: suppose that the valuation distributions describe a situation in which most of the mass is centred on 10 like before, but there are two other resistance levels at the outside of the support. To be more precise, let, 5 Supply-demand distributions, price and volume
In theorem 2.5 we derived the joint distribution of the clearing price X and the corresponding transacted volume V , given supply and demand distributions F A , F B and volumes N A , N B .
In this subsection we explore the dependence of the distribution of (X, V ) on F A and F B .
We shall fix N A and N B as equal constants (N A = N B = 50 in the examples below). It is also recalled that the distribution for (X, V ) was derived in a setting with a discrete price axis X with ticksize δ > 0 (below, we take δ = 0.01); normal distributions are discretized accordingly.
Varying consensus between bid-and ask-side
The supply and demand valuation distributions F A , F B express a difference of opinion concerning the valuation of the asset. Sell orders are typically priced higher than buy orders, a fact expressed in a stochastic way, through equation (1). We first consider how shifts of locations for F A , F B influence the joint distribution of clearing price and volume.
We consider three different choices of the supply and demand distributions, denoted F A , F B , The first case represents a relatively large difference between the locations of supply and demand distributions, while the second case represents a small difference, and the third complete consensus. In all three cases, the real equilibrium price is x E = 10, however, as can be seen from the left panel of figure 5 ,
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provide an asymptotic explanation for the observed increase in price uncertainty (c.f. the denominator of the variance in (7); the numerator is bounded and plays no role here). To re-phrase and summarize: when consensus between bid-and ask-sides increases, transacted volume increases and price uncertainty decreases. 
Increased uncertainty among market participants
Here we investigate the influence of valuation uncertainty among market participants on the distribution of clearing price and transacted volume: we consider three different choices of the supply and demand distributions, denoted however, that with locations and variances as chosen,
so that asymptotic variance of the clearing price increases when valuations become more widely spread (referring again to the variance in (7)).
But this explains only half of the mechanism that the model ascribes to the relation between valuation uncertainty and auction price variance. To appreciate the other half, consider a fourth different pairF A ,F B of supply and demand distributions that reflects less valuation uncertainty among market participants, defined bȳ F A = Φ 10.1,0.075 ,F B = Φ 9.9,0.075 .
As can be seen from the right panel of figure 7 , this choice of valuation distributions satisfies
which implies that the asymptotic variance of the clearing price also increases when we lower the variance of the valuation distributions. This is also confirmed by panel (a) of figure   8 , where the distribution of price-volume forF A ,F B is shown. To explain this observed inversion, consider F A and F B that are two normal distributions of equal variance σ 2 > 0, located at µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ R. Reasoning again asymptotically, the denominator of the expression for the variance in (7) equals,
As a function of σ, (12) has a maximum at σ = 1 2 |µ 1 −µ 2 | (see figure 9 for an example), which means that asymptotic variance of the clearing price is minimal at said level of valuation figure 8 panel (a) , auction price variance also increases. The heuristic reason for this inversion is as follows: when consensus between the bid-and ask-side of market is very low (large |µ 1 − µ 2 |) and valuation uncertainty among market participants is minimal (small σ), orders around x E are very scarce, so that clearing prices are based on small numbers of matchable orders, therefore displaying high variance; as the uncertainty in order prices on both sides increases, more orders appear around x E , lowering the variance of the clearing price. The added valuation uncertainty 'unlocks' an otherwise illiquid market, in which buyers and sellers rarely cross. So in a market with illiquidity-driven price movements, raised valuation uncertainty aids accurate price discovery.
Combination with the previous subsection invites the following, intuitively reasonable conclusion: observation of high levels of price variance can be driven by illiquidity or by valuation uncertainty among market participants; observation of the price and its fluctuations alone does not distinguish between those cases. To differentiate one must involve transacted volume, which is moderate when price variance is minimal, low in illiquid markets and high in markets with valuation uncertainty-driven price variance. 
Impact of market orders
In definition 2.6 the clearing price in the presence of excess liquidity ∆ is defined and its distribution is provided in proposition 2.7. Modelling the arrival of market orders as excess liquidity, this subsection compares clearing prices with and without market orders. Differences between clearing price distributions form the model's perspective on the price impact of market orders, a subject that has received quite some attention in the literature (see e.g. [2, 10, 11, 15, 16, 24] and references therein).
Clearing prices and market orders
Consider again the case that F A = F B = Φ µ,σ , for µ = 10, σ = 0.1 and (N A , N B ) ∼ Pois(50) 2 .
Departing from the case that this market is in equilibrium, next suppose that a market order of size |ω| arrives: as in eq. (5), we add an excess liquidity term to model this, in the form of constant functions ∆(x) = ω, where ω > 0 corresponds to a buy order and ω < 0 represents a sell order. In figure 10 the resulting clearing price distributions are plotted for various ω.
The common definition of the price impact function δp(ω) is the size of the shift in market price when a market order of size ω arrives. Empirical studies (see [10, 15, 16] , among many others) have shown that, in the situation of a continuous double auction, the price impact function is concave, and certain models confirm this concavity (see e.g. the seminal paper by Smith et al. [24] , or more recent work in this area [2, 11] ). To consider the matter in our model, we define the price impact function δp(ω) as the shift in expectation of X when a buy market order of size ω > 0 arrives. 
Price impact and resistance
One could view concavity of the price impact function as a specific form of resistance around the non-impacted price, induced by a lower density of orders close to the non-impacted price and higher densities further out. The examples above concern uni-model supply and demand distributions with substantial overlap. One wonders what would result if F A and F B would display the type of pronounced multi-modality that causes resistance levels (as in section 3 and eq. (8)). So instead of uni-modal supply and demand distributions, we take F A , F B to be bi-modal,
for µ 1 = 9.8, µ 2 = 10.2 and σ = 0.05 (see figure 12 ).
In figure 12 clearing price densities show that in the bi-modal case the influence of market orders is of a different nature and more significant magnitude than in the uni-modal case.
Orders of significant size are able to shift almost all the mass to one of the two extremes.
The reason is the same one that caused concavity of the price impact function in the unimodel case: in price regions where few orders are placed, even small market orders can have significant impact and push a market that is balanced between two resistance levels into one of its extremes. Needless to add, concavity of the price impact function is lost in the details that truly multi-modal valuation distributions entail. As a simple benchmark, the results are compared with results from a log-normal model.
Prediction of the closing price distribution

Estimation of the closing price distribution
To obtain the daily estimator for the clearing price distribution, transaction data is used: throughout the trading day, all transactions are recorded in a book that aggregates total volume traded for any price tick in the daily price range. In fact, two such books are kept, distinguished by the side of the market that initiated the trade. Half an hour before market close these books are normalized and converted into histogram-like estimators for the densities f A and f B . Expressed cumulatively, this leads to 'empirical distributions functions'F A (·) and F B (·) that serve as estimators for F A and F B . Essentially we use a volume-weighted version of the day's transacted orders to estimate market participants' valuations, based on the assumption that these valuations will be replicated in the closing auction.
For any choice of N A , N B , these daily estimators can be used to estimate the distribution for In all examples below, we choose N = 100 and β = 0.75 and note that these choices appear to work well for the five Eurostoxx 50 constituents considered below (with the possible exception of ABInbev, which fares better with even smaller β). Reported statistical results and conclusions do not appear to be very sensitive to small variations.
As an example, consider figure 13 , an (arbitrarily selected) day's trade in ING stocks and the estimate of the closing price distributionF X , estimated from daily transaction data, evaluated at 5 pm. Note the inhomogeneity of the estimated density and recall that regions of high clearing price density indicate resistance on the price axis. The fact that the realized closing price lies at one of the local maxima of the estimated density is probably not coincidental,
as the following statistical analysis shows.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test
To assess performance, we predict closing price distributions for the circa 250 trading days This statistical assessment is not just a technically convenient choice, what is assessed in this way is highly relevant to daily market practice: good QQ-plots and KS-statistics indicate that clearing price distribution estimators provide an accurate picture of the relation between quoted price and probability of execution in the auction, conditional on a closing price that fell inside the price range seen during the day.
To have a simple benchmark for comparison we also consider an alternative: we include a benchmark model that assumes that the daily log-return is normally distributed, with Bid-and ask-side volumes are left as free parameters (order flow); a choice for the distribution of these parameters (possibly heavy-tailed or very skewed) leads to distributions for clearing prices and transacted volumes, with or without a limit order book.
In the highly liquid auctions of section 3, the clearing price distribution converges to a normal central limit, with mean and variance in terms of supply/demand-valuation distributions and order flow imbalance. Most importantly, the variance of the limiting normal distribution at real equilibrium price x is inversely proportional to the density of orders around x. The interpretation is in terms of 'resistance levels' on the price axis, regions where price variance is suppressed due to density of orders.
In section 4, we consider the influence of order flow on clearing price distributions. Restriction to models involving Poisson or binomial assumptions concerning the amount of liquidity on offer is hard to justify. As confirmed in section 7, extreme or skewed order flow conditions are equally important. Section 5 explores the influence of valuation distributions with some illustrative simulations: for example, bringing valuation distributions closer together increases transacted volume and decreases price variance. Closer inspection of the price/volume distribution reveals that there are two fundamentally different types of price variance, one driven by illiquidity and the other by valuation uncertainty among market participants. To differentiate, one must involve transacted volume, which is moderate when auction price variance is minimal, low in illiquid markets and high in markets with valuation uncertainty-driven price variance.
In section 6, we analyse the model's description of market impact. Remarkably, the model produces a concave price impact function, especially when the valuation distributions are widely separated, reflecting a market in which the consensus is low. This is in line with empirical results [10, 15, 16] and with the theoretical results of Smith et al. [24] .
To statistically verify the validity of the model and estimates of the daily closing price distributions in section 7, we predict a year's worth of daily closing-price distributions for 5 shares in the Eurostoxx 50 index; Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics and QQ-plots demonstrate with ample statistical significance that the model predicts closing price distributions accurately, and compares favourably with a simpler, log-normal, alternative method of prediction. We conclude that the model's predicted clearing price distributions explain the observed randomness in closing prices well, confirming that the proposed model provides a proper description of price formation in call auctions.
A Notation and proofs
Notation and conventions
We denote the multinomial coefficient for n ≥ 3 by
The binomial distribution with parameters n and p is denoted Bin(n, p), the Poisson distribution with parameter λ is denoted by Pois(λ), the uniform distribution on − − → .
Let X ⊂ R be the price-axis which can be either discrete or continuous. The lowest possible price is denoted by x 0 := inf X . The valuation distributions for supply and demand prices, denoted F A and F B , are assumed to be distributions on the price-axis.
Proofs
The expressions we derive for price and price-volume distributions hinge on the following two lemmas, which convert finding a solution to eq. (2) into a question involving binomial distributions.
Lemma A.1 For any x ∈ R, we have the equivalence:
Proof The left implication follows immediately from the definition of X, so suppose X ≤ x. 
Therefore {y ∈ R : 
) is a pair of independent, binomially distributed random variables,
These two lemmas imply the following explicit expression for the clearing price distribution in terms of the distributions of supply and demand, F A and F B , conditional on N A and N B .
Proof From lemma A.1 and the independence of D A (x) and D B (x) it follows that,
where conditioning on N A , N B has been omitted for ease of notation. The result follows from lemma A.2.
Regarding definition 2.4, the following remark is in order. Similarly, we derive the joint distribution of (X, V ) from eq. (2) . Recall that the price-axis X is a discrete set, X := {x 0 , x 0 + δ, . . . }, for some δ > 0.
Proof In order to characterize the transacted volume V in a similar sense as the clearing price in Lemma A.1, define the generalized inverses D B are the generalized inverses of the empirical cumulative distribution functions F A , F B (for a distribution function F , its generalized inverse is defined as F −1 (p) = inf{x ∈ R : F (x) ≥ p}, for p ∈ [0, 1], see e.g. [25] , Chapter 21). For a given distribution function F , its generalized inverse satisfies
It follows from equation (14) that V is characterized by the following equivalences. 
which gives the first term of the solution in equation (3).
Now we turn to the second term in equation (16), for which we write 
where the last line follows by Lemma A.1 and equation (14) . The first term of this expression − − → N (µ(x E ), σ 2 (x E )),
Proof The assumption that 
Now denote Hence, we obtain the following weak limit,
w.
− − → N (0, 1), (20) where the asymptotic variance τ 2 (X) is given by, τ 2 (X) = α F A (X)(1 − F A (X)) + (1 − α)F B (X)(1 − F B (X)).
With the help of the distribution function F R , defined by the convex combination,
we rewrite equation (20) as follows,
− − → N (0, 1).
Since 0 < τ (X) < 1 and D is bounded, we conclude that F R (X) converges to F R (x E ) in probability. The assumptions on F A and F B ensure that F R has a Lebesgue density f R and that F R is invertible with continuous inverse F −1 R : [0, 1] → R, so it follows that X converges to x E in probability. By continuity it follows that τ (X) converges in probability to τ (x E ) and D(X) to D(x E ). By Slutsky's Lemma (see e.g. [25] , Lemma 2.8), we arrive at,
The Delta-method (see e.g. [25] , Theorem 3.1) then leads to,
where, according to the inverse function theorem,
.
